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Operational depth. 67 By the late morning of the 6th, however, Amer was in a state of panic. The force sent by the Egyptian 3d Infantry Division to al-Arish had failed to break through at Bir Lahfan, and by noon, it was withdrawing to the second line of defenses at Gebel Libni and Bir al-Hasana. At this point, the Egyptian high command realized the gravity of its mistake in not anticipating a major operational maneuver along the route to Bir Lahfan. 68 That afternoon at around 1630, Amer—badly shaken by recent events on the battlefield—issued a general withdrawal order to his forces in the Sinai, but one that failed to delineate any phases in the withdrawal.

Sharon, for his part, found his next task after the battle for Abu Ageila a mere exercise in troop movement. After giving his ugdah a much needed rest during the remainder of 6 June, he dispatched a part of his force to take Qusaymah the following morning, the 7th. By the time the Israelis arrived there, however, the Egyptian 10th Infantry Brigade had already departed. 72 Naguib had lost the battle for Abu Ageila in less than twenty hours, as the IDF dramatically reversed its performance of 1956.

71 By the end of the next day, after four days of war, the Egyptian Army was in ruins, having lost 80 percent of its equipment. Israeli victories in the forward tactical areas of Rafah, al-Arish, and Abu Ageila had led to the IDF's successful pursuit of the Egyptians to the sealed off passes, where they were defeated. The Sinai was left completely in Israeli hands. Sharon, for his part, found his next task after the battle for Abu Ageila a mere exercise in troop movement. After giving his ugdah a much needed rest during the remainder of 6 June, he dispatched a part of his force to take Qusaymah the following morning, the 7th.