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As such, we note potential practices with especial relevance for an organization with serious, well-financed enemies; these practices include air-gapping, accountability, denial, and deception. Chapter Nine is a brief summary. The appendixes discuss questions raised in the monograph. Appendix A deals with the (overwrought) issue of what constitutes an act of war. Appendix B posits a model for assessing the costs and benefits of an explicit rather than an implicit cyberdeterrence policy. Appendix C looks at arms control issues.

Not surprisingly, communities contemplating or developing a cyberattack capabilities have a greater interest in cyberdeterrence than communities armed with a conventional response capability. For our purposes, assuming retaliation in kind raises almost all the issues that more-violent forms of retaliation do, as well as many issues that the latter do not. 43 This is not just an American sentiment. From Indrani Bagchi, “China Mounts Cyber Attacks on Indian Sites,” The Times of India, May 5, 2008: A quiet effort is under way to set up defense mechanisms, but cyberwarfare is yet to become a big component of India’s security doctrine.

Such an attack cannot be duplicated at will, as an exploit can (unless used as a launch point for a hacker or malware attack that cannot otherwise work as well). Revealing one turncoat can lead to investigations that could unravel entire recruitment networks. : CERT Coordination Center, Software Engineering Institute, Carnegie Mellon University, June 2005. 27 According to Simon Singh, Britain had captured thousands of Enigma machines and distributed them among its former colonies, who believed that the cipher was as secure as it had seemed to the Germans.