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The second pattern is of course related closely to the first: as naturalism becomes increasingly the property of theoretical rather than practical reason, its non-attunement with ordinary views of value comes to the fore. The next point to be made is that, it seems fair to say, we have ceased to be much preoccupied with the axiological character of naturalism in general: we argue about the cogency of particular attempts to naturalize moral and other species of value, but we do not pose the question of what naturalism as such implies regarding the very possibility of value as such.

But it is one-sided to regard spirit in this way as having only become an actual existence after being merely a potentiality [Aber es ist einseitig, den Geist so als Werden aus dem Ansich nur zum Fu¨rsichsein kommen zu lassen]. True, Nature is the immediate – but even so, as the other of spirit, its existence is a relativity . . spirit is no less before than after Nature, it is not merely the metaphysical Idea of it [er ist ebenso vor als nach der Natur, nicht bloß die metaphysische Idee derselben].

The naturalist may of course respond by drawing a distinction between extravagant and moderate demands in the sphere of value, insisting that once we have achieved maturity – once we have stopped asking for heaven on earth, once it has been realized that the death of God is a problem only in adolescence – we will be able to appreciate how moderate valuedemands, at least, can be satisfied within naturalism. I believe this is a common view. My observation is just that it is deeply unclear how we should set about measuring our value-needs and determining whether the recommendation of moderation makes sense, and that the historical record supports the idea that there is a puzzle here which contemporary naturalism cannot really be said to have engaged with.