By Pierre-Jacques Courtois
What facts is enough to justify the discharge of a computer-based security serious process? How should still this facts be provided to certification our bodies or regulatory experts? What top practices may be utilized? those are only some of the questions addressed via Justifying the Dependability of Computer-based Systems, which gives a framework for the justification of the dependability of a computer-based process. The publication additionally explores the various extra basic facets of defense assessment, comparable to the character of types, arguments, facts and documentation, and the how you can care for forms of threat and uncertainty.
Justifying the Dependability of Computer-based Systems might be of price to software program, laptop process, instrumentation and regulate engineers, and regulators operating in sectors resembling nuclear safety.
Pierre-Jacques Courtois is a Professor within the division of computing device technology and Engineering on the Catholic collage of Louvain-la-Neuve, with specific learn pursuits in safety-critical software program for the nuclear undefined. He has greater than fifteen years adventure within the nuclear protection undefined, having labored as a nuclear protection consultant in Finland and the united kingdom, and as a expert to the overseas Atomic strength company (IAEA) and the corporation for monetary Co-operation and improvement (OECD).
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Extra info for Justifying the Dependability of Computer-based Systems: With Applications in Nuclear Engineering
The most obvious and natural direction to take first was to look at structures which had proved to be the most efficient to specify, design and implement the hardware and software of a complex computer system, and to remember that a well-known principle of engineering is that these structures are necessarily hierarchical (cf. g. [12, 73, 74, 93, 94]). Practical experience, accumulated in several safety cases in nuclear engineering, later corroborated by a formal approach , suggested that the evidence required to justify an initial dependability requirement can be organized in a multi-level structure.
3. clm i. evd i, i = 1…4. While the notion of claim is syntactic, evidence is part of the semantics of the justification. How evidence makes a claim statement “true” requires a model to formulate and valuate the statement, which will be the subject of the Description Part of this book. 5 A dependability justification is the set of claims and evidence components which justify the implementation and operation of a set of initial dependability requirements on a computer system, given the environment constraints and the preliminary input-output specifications of this system.
System architects and designers use the terms “requirement” and “requirement specification” in relation to their design work. They do not normally talk about “claims”. One usually starts to make claims on a computer system when an application has to be made for approving or licensing the system for a given usage, or when dealing with regulators, safety authorities or their technical support organizations, or when submitting the system to independent assessment. In those circumstances, another difference is that a requirement is essentially a statement specifying what the computer system is originally designed to do and how, while a claim is a statement addressing the appropriateness of these specifications for a given usage.