By Richard L. Russell

I would have leaned towards 4 stars in this e-book, that's definitely an invaluable contribution, however it falls into the second one tier for being a transparent hit job---and shallow in addition. Gaps within the author's interpreting (or writing) seemed from the very starting. misplaced first superstar there.

He defines strategic intelligence as concerned with threats and using strength. regardless of his point out of Adda Bozeman, he doesn't appear to have understood that the guts of strategic intelligence is deep and sustained research and figuring out of overseas cultures, histories, languages, genealogies, and ties that bind--financial, non secular, tribal, ethnic, and so on. misplaced moment megastar here.

There are ten high-level threats, twelve remediation guidelines, and 8 worldwide challengers, and all 30 of those elements needs to be studied as a complete and in relation, within the current, close to, and much time period. something much less isn't really strategic intelligence.

I am stricken by means of the author's particularly black and white bias in tarring CIA with all of the wrongs and exempting the policy-makers, and particularly Cheney, Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, and Feith, for his or her many mistakes and omissions in addition to 25 particular excessive crimes and misdemeanors dedicated by way of Cheney on my own as special within the One percentage Doctrine: Deep inside of America's Pursuit of Its Enemies considering that September 11 and Vice: Dick Cheney and the Hijacking of the yankee Presidency.

The writer has learn (or written) selectively. His examples of failure on Korea don't comprise reference of the Secretary of State's Press membership visual appeal during which South Korea was once explicitly ignored of the yank orbit. His shallow assurance of Viet-Nam doesn't reap the benefits of a scarcity of connection with None So Blind: a private Account of the Intelligence Failure in Vietnam, conflict with no home windows: a real Account of a tender military Officer Trapped in an Intelligence Cover-Up in Vietnam, or Who the Hell Are We Fighting?: the tale of Sam Adams and the Vietnam Intelligence Wars, between others.

His assurance of Sept. 11 can be poor. whereas he adequately criticizes CIA for failing to truly ramp up either clandestine penetrations and analytic expertise, and he faults the FBI for now not sharing with CIA, he fails to say the nine particular warnings from overseas governments that the White apartment selected to use to accomplish "our Pearl Harbor"--the Israeli's even despatched a video team to seize the known-in-advance occasion for his or her information, whereas Dick Cheney geared up an "exercise" with a command heart now not within the goal construction the place the command heart was once initially outfitted at nice price.

On Iraq, i discovered the writer irritating--almost whining--in his never-flagging attempt to tar the CIA. obviously he's not conscious of, or doesn't desire to credits, the defection of Salaam Hussein's son in legislation and the 25+ line crossers Charlie Allen is related to have despatched in, as stated in Bob Woodward's country of Denial: Bush at warfare, half III all of whom got here again with a similar tale: saved the cookbooks, destroyed the shares, bluffing for nearby influence's sake.

I believe the writer on a few key points:

1) DNI wouldn't have been created, this simply created one other layer of paperwork so shall we advertise the losers who obtained us the following another time.

2) CIA is out of contact with fact. whereas the writer glosses over the significance of open assets of knowledge, he's obviously thoroughly unexpected with what appropriately performed OSINT can do, to incorporate tribal genealogies and orders of conflict, financial-family ties and asset mapping, and so on.

3) the writer is unquestionably right to whale away at CIA protection. at the one hand, they didn't wish my wife's record at the three hundred overseas intelligence officials she met at one in every of my meetings, together with the LtGen from the KGB ("did you sleep with any of them? No? ignore it.") and at the different those are the morons who confused a GS-15 who dared to name Kazhikistan to solicit neighborhood perspectives, to the purpose that she give up CIA and is now more than pleased because the leader of the Intelligence research department at one of many Combatant instructions. i used to be barred from the campus by means of those fools for correctly returning a categorised rfile from USMC to CIA, eager about permission and transported either methods through approved couriers.

4) the writer is right at the fossilized layers of "management" and forms, and he does offer an outstanding evaluate of shortcomings, yet I for one, with event throughout 3 of the 4 Directorates again within the day, think of this publication to be a case of "several hundred bleats too many." sure, CIA is a large number. certain, CIA shouldn't have 800 SES positions and 200-400 cubicles that don't percentage with one other. it's all that undesirable? No. i may flip CIA round in ninety days simply by recruiting Amazon to mobilize all of the most sensible authors and readers on each subject; via growing exterior non-secret multinational intelligence-policy councils on each subject of significance as i'm doing now with the Earth Intelligence community; via asking DoD to make the Coalition Coordination middle right into a Multinational info Sharing Hub that does OSINT in addition to multinational HUMINT and close-in emplacement of US-provided technical units. someplace in there i'd fireplace thirds of the contractors, half the safety humans, thirds of the legal professionals, and such a lot of FBIS. this isn't rocket science.

The e-book ends weakly, with a point out of horizon scanning, which Singapore has become a twenty first century new craft of intelligence, however the writer obviously has now not learn Tom Quiggin's Seeing the Invisible: nationwide defense Intelligence in an doubtful Age, and is surprising to boot with the wider literatures on details society, glossy intelligence, approach & strength constitution, rising non-traditional in addition to catastrophic and disruptive threats, anti-Americanism and blow-back, and the damaging effect of household politics on sound international and nationwide safeguard policy.

This isn't compatible as a textbook.

On Intelligence: Spies and Secrecy in an Open World
The New Craft of Intelligence: own, Public, & Political--Citizen's motion guide for struggling with Terrorism, Genocide, illness, poisonous Bombs, & Corruption
Information Operations: All details, All Languages, for all time

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Additional info for Sharpening Strategic Intelligence: Why the CIA Gets It Wrong and What Needs to Be Done to Get It Right

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Nitze read that, looked up at me from his desk, and asked if I spoke French and listened to the radio. ”28 The CIA, by and large, also failed to warn President Carter of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. In 1979, satellite imagery revealed that the Soviets were building up forces along the border with Afghanistan. Former senior CIA official Douglas MacEachin in a retrospective analysis of the CIA’s strategic intelligence performance found that “The military intervention the Soviets carried out in the last week of December 1979 – particularly its timing and scope – came as a surprise to the US intelligence community at large and to US policy officials in general.

Khan network that was establishing nuclear weapons programs in Libya and Iran; and make an accurate assessment of nuclear weapons programs in South Africa and North Korea. The CIA followed in the footsteps of these intelligence failures with two more of even greater magnitude because of the direct and negative consequences to American national security. Chapter 4, “Blundering in the ‘War on Terrorism,’” makes a deeper examination than media coverage of the root causes of the CIA’s failure to sufficiently penetrate al-Qaeda to disrupt the 9/11 plot.

The process, however, had not always produced the result for which the CIA’s senior management had hoped. The CIA, for example, had nurtured a close briefing relationship with president-elect Bill Clinton, who welcomed CIA briefings. After Clinton assumed the Oval Office, however, the CIA’s direct access was cut off, and CIA PDB briefers were relegated to delivering the PDB to Clinton’s national security advisor. 52 The 9/11 and Iraq War Watersheds The ultimate aim of the CIA’s case officers and analysts is to provide strategic intelligence to the country’s top national security officials to 8:40 P1: KAE 0521878159c01 CUFX131/Russell 18 0 521 86435 6 printer: cupusbw February 28, 2007 SHARPENING STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE help reduce the ambiguity of international security issues.

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