Show description

J-STARS in particular provided critical data on the disposition of Iraq’s ground forces just prior to the start of the coalition’s offensive, reassuring the coalition that its surprise maneuver around the enemy’s right flank would go virtually unchallenged. During the Battle of Al-Khafji on January 29, 1991, J-STARS detected an Iraqi convoy of follow-on forces moving south from Kuwait City. This information was immediately passed to coalition commanders, who ordered air strikes against the advancing Iraqi troops.

Walk-ins, on the other hand, are inherently suspect, since there is always the possibility that the supposed volunteer has in fact been dispatched by his own country’s intelligence service to pass false or misleading information, inform his country about the opposing service’s methods of operation, or entrap one of the opposing service’s intelligence officers so as to bring about his or her arrest or expulsion. However, an intelligence service that is too suspicious of walk-ins may miss opportunities to obtain information that it could have easily had.

During these meetings Walker and his KGB contact would walk the streets[,] . . 31 In other cases, intelligence services operating against the United States have preferred to meet sources in Canada or Mexico. These are logical choices, given the ease with which Americans can visit these countries and the large numbers who do so. ” These techniques are useful in cases in which the officer and source have an innocent ostensible reason for communicating with each other but suspect that their letters are likely to be opened and read by the opposing side.