By Yasuhiko Tomida (auth.), Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka (eds.)
Some may well ask "Why Locke's conception of data now?" even though favored for his social philosophy, Locke has been criticized for his paintings within the box of epistemology ever because the e-book of the Essay. it truly is while if Locke serves basically as an instance of ways to not imagine. while humans criticize Locke, and so they cite the antagonistic commen taries of Berkeley, Kant, Husserl, or Sellars. yet, one may ask, are they now not all so wanting to express the distinction in their personal epistemo logical perspectives that they distort and underestimate Locke's concept? Russell aptly famous in his background of Western Philosophy that: not anyone has but succeeded in inventing a philosophy immediately credible and self-consis tent. Locke geared toward credibility, and accomplished it on the cost of consistency. lots of the nice philosophers have performed the other. A philosophy which isn't self-consis tent can't be absolutely real, yet a philosophy that's self-consistent can rather well be utterly fake. the main fruitful philosophies have contained evident inconsistencies, yet for that very cause were partly precise. there isn't any cause to feel self constant procedure comprises extra fact than one that, like Locke's, is clearly kind of fallacious. (B. Russell, A background of Western Philosophy [New York: Simon and Schuster, 1945], p. 613. ) the following Russell is uncommonly charitable with Locke.
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Additional resources for The Logic of the Living Present: Experience, Ordering, Onto-Poiesis of Culture
That discussion begins with the following statements: [.. J/deas become general, by separating from them the circumstances of Time, and Place, and any other Ideas, that may determine them to this or that particular Existence. By this way of abstraction they are made capable of representing more Individuals than one; each of which, having in it a conformity to that abstract Idea, is (as we call it) of that sort. (Ill, iii, 6) At first sight, this assertion seems to be a mere summary of II, xi, 9.
W. C. Swabey, "Locke's Theory of Ideas," in Philosophical Review, Vol. XLII (1933). But this interpretation cannot deal with a passage such as II, iii, 2 just quoted, and is also in discord with many other statements. " (IV, ii, 12) There is no other way to understand the term "idea" in this passage than to take it as referring to the sensible. 4 Ayers, retaining the imagist interpretation, tries to interpret Locke's theory of abstraction (theory of general ideas) with a notion of "partial Consideration" which we shall I 2 IDEA AND THING 29 discuss later.
Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. A. C. Fraser (New York: Dover, 1894), Bk. II, Ch. ii, Sec. 2, n. 2 & Bk. II, Ch. vii, Sec. 7, n. 1; Swabey, op. , p. 578; J. W. Yolton, "Locke's Concept of Experience," in C. B. Martin and D. M. ), Locke and Berkeley (London: Macmillan, 1968), p. 44; S. L. Nathanson, "Locke's Theory of Ideas," Journal of the History of Philosophy, Vol. XI (1973), p. 35. All of these writers put the phrase in quotes, but they only suggest that "idea" is different from "sensation" (Swabey), or suggest that the way of acquiring "simple ideas" is different from the case of "complex ideas" (Yolton), or do not clearly show the point (Fraser), or merely say that it shows that having a "percept" is not a sufficient condition for having a concept (Nathanson).