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1). Here in Physics 1, however, Aristotle almost immediately starts to correct the Gorgianic assimilation of Parmenides and Melissus within his own adapted classification of principles. First he has to explain that it does not properly belong to natural philosophy to consider whether what really is (to on) is one and unchanging, because such an entity could not serve as a first principle in natural philosophy (Ph. 2, 184b25–185a5). As he proceeds to clarify this point, Aristotle starts to distinguish between the strict monism of Melissus, who really did argue that only one thing exists and that it is totally undifferentiated and unchanging (a view Aristotle rightly regards as merely provocative and unworthy of serious attention), and the more philosophically serious monism of Parmenides, a view he represents as a form of substance monism ultimately compatible with the existence of other things.

What must be” thus proves to be not only a necessary but, in many ways, a perfect entity. The evidence of the poem suggests that this entity has no evident relation with the natural world. It thus plays no role in Parmenides’ cosmology. To understand Parmenides’ role in the development of early Greek cosmology, one must look to what can still be reconstructed of his own cosmology. Parmenides’ conception of “what is and cannot not be” belongs, as Aristotle properly recognized, to the higher domain of first philosophy or theology.

Another example is the understanding of Aristotle’s conception of human happiness (eudaimonia). There is a long-standing debate over whether Aristotle conceives of human happiness as constituted by a single goal and aim (telos) or whether he has a more inclusive conception that recognizes a plurality of goods as constituting an overall good life. Readers will find that debate reflected in different ways by the contributions by Scott and Hatzistavrou. These differences provide a sense of how open and lively many of the key debates in ancient philosophy remain.