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Given that counting on allies and on I&W both entail risk, anything less in added personnel and funding would leave the United States unprepared to counter severe or multiple Type III insurgencies. , through a civilian reserve) and funds (through emergency appropriations) if future COIN needs are at the level posed by Iraq and Afghanistan combined. S. force in the Muslim world. But unlike building ample civil capability, the opportunity for swift prog- 6 Interview with author in Afghanistan, 2007.

S. military requirements need to be rethought and retooled to reduce reliance on large-scale ground presence, to support civil capabilities, to make more and smarter use of information, to prepare and enable local forces, and to perform critical military tasks that only they can. In sum, the United States needs a more complete and balanced set of capabilities than it currently has to counter Type III insurgency. II. Required Capabilities Civil Capabilities Although it is widely conceded that the United States is grossly short of civil capabilities for COIN, there is no accepted analysis of the scale and makeup of that shortcoming.

The United States cannot disengage from the reality of Islamic insurgency. It cannot abandon COIN without running grave risks to its interests and friends, to the fate of the Middle East, to global security, to global energy security, and to its own safety. S. military power in the Muslim world, it would be folly to think that disengagement from that world would mollify the jihadists and end Islamic violence. S. military power in the Muslim world, it must build more complete and balanced COIN capabilities and use them Summary lvii wisely and steadfastly to enable legitimate local partners to win the contest for the Muslim people.