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60 Nachlass Herbst 1887, 9 [91]; KGW VIII 2, 49. 34 Nietzsche's Concept of Truth is everywhere apparent, has led to the somewhat perverse denial of the truth and reality of the physical world. The chief offenders in perpetrating this decadent and reprehensible notion are, according to Nietzsche, Plato (more properly, Platonism) and Christianity (". . denn Christenthum ist Piatonismus für's Volk' . "51). The ontological dualism in question here between the "real" world and the world of "mere appearances" (i.

Constant change, ambiguity, contradiction, paradox, etc. are much more difficult to cope with, and require a comparatively high degree of will to power to be organized (i. e. interpreted) into a manageable environment. The ambiguous and contradictory — the unknown — is frightening and threatening. Therefore we have constructed for ourselves a model of reality which is eminently "knowable," and consequently subject to our control. Pain and suffering have traditionally been held to stem from "ignorance" about the way the world "really" is: the more predictable and reliable the world is, the less our chances are of suffering through error, of being unpleasandy surprised.

It need scarcely be said that this world-interpretation is immeasurably more conducive to the growth and enhancement of the will to power than the static worldview. And the increase of will to power is Nietzsche's only criterion: Alles Geschehen, alle Bewegung, alles Werden als ein Feststellen von Gradund Kraftverhältnissen, als ein Kampf . . 50 VII. The "Real" World and the "Apparent" World The static view of truth and reality, which Nietzsche sees as totally antithetical to his own, is certainly not regarded by its adherents as simply one possible interpretation of the world among a host of other possible interpretations.