By Jake Blood
A close examination of the position of intelligence in shaping America’s belief of the Vietnam War, taking a look heavily on the intelligence management and choice technique. In 1967, intelligence used to be known as upon to reinforce help for the Vietnam warfare and allowed America’s leaders to painting a ‘bankrupt’ enemy able to give up the battlefield. The audacious Tet Offensive of 1968 shattered this picture and even though it ended with an American army victory, it's remembered because the juncture whilst American help became opposed to the battle. Public opinion at the struggle used to be a chief predicament for the Johnson management, and US intelligence performed a decisive position in supplying a very confident view of the enemy’s loss of life. because the "bankrupt" enemy attacked with a ferocity and depth that stunned the yankee public, intelligence had set-up the yank public for a fall. How, americans desired to recognize, might an enemy whose numbers have been so decimated now release such an all-out offensive? From this exam and an realizing of the way the enemy considered itself, the realization is made that 4 critical breaches of intelligence etiquette happened through the interval top as much as Tet. This phenomenon is the ‘Tet impression’ – the lack of credibility while leaders painting a state of affairs dependent upon intelligence that's proven to be disingenuous. This e-book may be of significant curiosity to scholars of the Vietnam struggle, intelligence and strategic reviews regularly.
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Additional resources for The Tet Effect: Intelligence and the Public Perception of War (Cass Military Studies)
It was a formidable assemblage, a rich blend of Wall Street and Washington, soldiers and diplomats, men who had shaped and preserved a bipartisan foreign policy consensus for two decades…. 47 This ‘formidable assemblage’ gathered for cocktails and briefings on 1 November 1967. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Earle Wheeler presented the latest figures, numbers, and statistics from General Westmoreland in Vietnam, all of which clearly showed that the US military was making progress and winning the war in Vietnam.
But in late 1967, this symmetry broke; those who opposed the war continued to increase at a rate greater than those who supported the war. The deciding factor was those who had previously held no opinion. Figure 1 Public opinion 1965–1967. , 1973), 54–55. Those who had been undecided, who neither supported nor opposed the war in Vietnam, remained fairly constant in 1965 and 1966, from just over 15 percent in 1965 to just under 20 percent by the beginning of 1967. In 1967, however, those who declared themselves as having ‘no opinion’ on the war, began a steady decrease, from just under 20 percent at the start of the year, to just under 10 percent by the end of the year.
There were enemy units composed of just North Vietnamese; these units were organized in a way similar to US forces into brigades and divisions. There were also the Viet Cong (VC), who were indigenous South Vietnamese communists; their organizational structure was varied, with main forces that were similar to the brigades of the North Vietnamese, and local forces which were closely tied to a limited geographic area and sometimes operated as brigades, but just as often took on less stringently defined structures.