By John Ferris
John Ferris' paintings in strategic and intelligence history is generally praised for its originality and the breadth of its learn. eventually his significant pioneering articles are actually on hand during this one unmarried quantity. In Intelligence and process those crucial articles were essentially revised to include new facts and data withheld through governments after they have been first released. This quantity reshapes the examine of communications intelligence by way of tracing Britain's improvement of cipher machines supplying the context to extremely and Enigma, and via explaining how British and German indications intelligence formed the wasteland battle. the writer additionally explains how intelligence affected British technique and international relations from 1874 to 1940 and international international relations through the Nineteen Thirties and the second one international battle. ultimately he lines the roots for modern intelligence, and analyzes intelligence and the RMA in addition to the position of intelligence within the 2003 Gulf War.This quantity finally brings new gentle to our realizing of the relatives among intelligence, technique and international relations among the top of the nineteenth century and the start of the twenty first century.
Read or Download Intelligence and Strategy: Selected Essays (Studies in Intelligence) PDF
Similar intelligence & espionage books
Offers a risk-management approach may support senior Air strength leaders to (1) concentration making plans at the such a lot salient threats, (2) achieve better readability at the hazards linked to substitute classes of motion throughout a number of futures, (3) retain a feeling of the continual uncertainties linked to any coverage selection, and (4) successfully speak their judgments approximately threat to key audiences.
Netwar―like cyberwar―describes a brand new spectrum of clash that's rising within the wake of the data revolution. What exceptional netwar is the networked organizational constitution of its practitioners and their quickness in coming jointly in swarming assaults. To confront this new kind of clash, it will be significant for governments, army, and legislation enforcement to start networking themselves.
Why might a journalist who was once an ardent socialist and an anti-Nazi throughout the waning years of the Weimar Republic choose to visit paintings for the Gestapo in another country? Hans Wesemann, a veteran of worldwide conflict I and a profitable journalist, fled his local Germany in 1933 after writing a couple of anti-Nazi articles.
From his cage in a putrid, overcrowded Indian gaol, Paul Jordan displays on a lifestyles lived at the part and curses the miscalculation that robbed him of his freedom. His formative years, marred through the lack of his father and brother, makes him hell bent on being the easiest of the easiest – an ambition he achieves by way of being chosen to affix the elite SAS.
- The A to Z of World War II. The War Against Japan
- Money in the Bank: Lessons Learned from Past Counterinsurgency (COIN) Operations
- Code Warriors: NSA’s Codebreakers and the Secret Intelligence War Against the Soviet Union
- Courting Disaster: How the CIA Kept America Safe and How Barack Obama Is Inviting the Next Attack
- Certain Death in Sierra Leone The SAS and Operation Barras 2000
- Historical dictionary of air intelligence
Extra resources for Intelligence and Strategy: Selected Essays (Studies in Intelligence)
Salisbury, that is, intended to use Indian intelligence to manipulate the actions of a Tsar whose attitudes had been uncovered by British intelligence. The India Secretary also noted not only aggressive but defensive attitudes among Tsarist authorities. Russia seemed more concerned with defending itself against Yarkand than in conquering the Tekke Turkomans. Russian authorities “complain of an oppression” regarding Yarkand and Afghanistan. They “have a fixed idea, from which it is difficult to move them, that we are importing arms and sending military instructors (to Kashgar) in order to get up a war with the Russians”; they “indulge in similar myths” regarding Merv.
Notably, when Salisbury formulated his policy toward Russia and Turkey, he did not simultaneously fear a Russian threat to India, save in the sense that British support for Turkey might spark one. 100 The development of power and deterrent capability were one thing, their application another. Salisbury was fundamental first in preventing Britain from blocking Russian moves against Turkey until December 1877, and then in unleashing Lord Beaconsfield. It seems hard to believe that the India Secretary would have adopted this approach had he regarded Russia as an imminent threat to India.
Each had read the other’s mail. Wellesley’s intelligence had indicated that Ignatiev opposed further Russian expansion in Central Asia and influenced a Tsar who was unusually sensitive to British susceptibilities there. On the foundation of material provided by Wellesley, Salisbury made a subtle and precise attempt to pull the strings of Russian decision making to further British interests. This material also illuminates another issue. From mid-1877 to early 1878, Derby and Salisbury viewed policy toward Russia and interpreted information on it in identical terms.